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It is evident that Professor Kelsen's book is not to be lightly placed
in the hands of the uninitiated as an "introduction." For the advanced
scholar, it provides a challenge to the critical faculties and an example of
both the rewards and the limitations of analytical jurisprudence.
OLIVER J. LISSITZYN
Assistant Professorof PublicLaw, Columbia University
JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW. By Edwin W. Patterson.
Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, 1953. Pp. xiii, 649. $7.50.
Ordinarily one would expect the Reviews Editor of a law review to
invite book reviews from men with special competence in the respective
fields covered by the books. That the Columbia editor departed from this
expectation in the present instance may not have been inadvertence. Edwin
Patterson's jurisprudence text is not written for the savant so much as for
the tyro. Whether it is meaningful and useful as intended can be judged
best, perhaps, by one who himself has scarce crossed the threshold of this
discipline.
Jurisprudence:Men and Ideas of the Law was written as a textbook for
students enrolled in Columbia's jurisprudence course. It appeared first in
mimeograph in 1940, and has gone through three revisions before emerging
in its present printed form. Thirteen years is not a record incubation period,
but it typifies the care and thoroughness with which Professor Patterson
works and with which he has prepared the present volume. Each sentence,
each paragraph, each section is, to me, a clear statement of his meaning and
serves his purpose well.
What is his purpose? His own answer is, "To present concisely and
clearly the ideas of the legal order and the general theories about law which
have been and are most influential on the law of the United States ... "I
Professor Patterson assumes aright that the first thing the apprentice needs
when he begins a serious exploration of the province of jurisprudence is a
systematic exposition of first principles and basic concepts. Accordingly he
locates the province of jurisprudence and classifies jurisprudential ideas into
the various schools. The author apparently recognizes that the law school
course in jurisprudence is all too often a prolonged bull session in which are
aired the prejudices of a more or less informed teacher and the off-hand
reactions of the students. This may not be wholly without value, because it
stimulates thought about serious and worthwhile questions. But undisciplined, uninformed discussion produces results of lasting consequence only
fortuitously. It is trite but true that unless we build upon the experience
and knowledge and insights of our forebears, we have unnecessarily to ex1. P. vii.

HeinOnline -- 54 Colum. L. Rev. 308 1954

1954]

BOOKS

plore a lot of not-so-virgin territory. Professor Patterson's book is an excellent antidote for this tendency. Similarly, the lawyer or judge who
decides to remedy some of the jurisprudential omissions of his preparatory
years needs an orderly presentation of what the best minds of the ages have
had to say about the legal order. From there he must rely upon his own
intelligence and curiosity.
The Patterson book, then, is directed to the person, lawyer or otherwise, who wants to acquire within reasonable compass an accurate and
orderly knowledge of the principal problems of jurisprudence. In my judgment the book fulfills its purpose.
There seems to be an accelerating tendency toward specialization in the
practice of law. 2 In this context, it is more desirable than ever that a lawyer
take a look at the legal system as a whole. For those who may be skeptical
about the values of jurisprudence, Professor Patterson seeks, with considerable success, to make them articulate. 3 Some of the values are practical
in the sense that they pertain to the so-called bread-and-butter level of law
work, such as understanding particular legal problems or gaining insights
into the thinking of specific judges and lawyers. Some are practical in that
they relate to broader areas of specific accomplishment, such as Savigny's
influence in deferring adoption of a German code-a "mere" philosopher of
the law affecting its course materially.4 Again, one may better understand
the development of American legal education and perhaps American law
itself when he sees how neatly the early American law teachers fitted into
the historical school of jurisprudence. 5 As for the least tangible values, hear
the author:
To these vocational inducements one more may be added.
Why should one enter the profession of the law unless one seeks,
in addition to the means of livelihood, a lifelong opportunity to
pry beneath the welter of statutes and decisions and to see the law
as a part of a larger whole? Not since the eighteenth century (in
the English speaking world, at least) has the literature of jurisprudence been more seething with ideas. Some of these ideas will
help shape the law and the society of the future. Through jurisprudence you may look at life in society
and, like O.W. Holmes,
6
you may catch an echo of the infinite.
Philosophical concepts require illustration if they are to be remembered
long. To the extent permitted by limitations on length, Professor Patterson
gives examples from legal materials (some 250 cases are cited) and from
common situations and incidents familiar even to the layman. The breadth
2. Indeed, the American Bar Association has established a committee to study the
problems and relative merits of specializationof law practice.
3. See especially §§ 1.00, 1.10.
4. § 4.31.
5. Pp. 418,420.
6. P.4.
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of citation to other writings-jurisprudential and otherwise-is suggested by
the length of the table of "Books and Periodicals Cited": 24 pages. The
value of the book as a text and as a reference work is enhanced by thorough
indexing. Nevertheless, for more extensive illustration and for highly desirable primary sampling of the writings of the important jurisprudents, it
has been necessary to refer the reader to original sources or to anthologies
such as Hall's Readings in Jurisprudence or Readings in Jurisprudenceand
Legal Philosophy by the late Morris and Felix Cohen. Professor Patterson's
book might be used without .more, but it will be rare that the reader is not
stimulated to explore beyond it.
Although this is primarily a book about (other) men of the law and
their ideas, the author makes his own position evident from time to time.
While he usually states both sides of a controversial question, he nevertheless writes from his own rather than a "neutral" point of view, and does not
hesitate to criticize and on occasion to demolish that which he deems unsound.7 This has its dangers for the neophyte, but they are outweighed by
the advantages of this approach, for a liveliness otherwise lacking is provided, and the good sense of the criticisms is generally apparent. In a brief
passage of his book, Professor Patterson summarizes his own philosophy of
law in a manner similar to his statement in the 1941 symposium, My Philosophy of Law.
One highly trained in jurisprudence may find the book something less
than challenging. Indeed, this charge I have already heard. It is true that
Professor Patterson does not write with sweep. Nor does he rely on exacerbation to force the mind to action as do, say, Jerome Frank or Karl Llewellyn.
But there is, to me, real interest and challenge in a readable, understandable,
straight-forward account of the ABC's of jurisprudence. It is for material
of this kind that we are most indebted to Professor Patterson. I think it
neither unfair nor presumptuous to suggest that he will not be known as a
towering legal philosopher in the sense that he has "created" any new school
of legal thought or even added significantly to our store of specific insights
into matters legal and philosophical. Indeed, he describes himself as an
eclectic in these matters, and it is obvious that his choices have been heavily
influenced by association with Roscoe Pound and John Dewey. Yet he who
organizes, exposes, and criticizes the ideas of others, and so enables us to
know and perhaps to comprehend-he is in a very real sense a philosopher, a
jurisprudent, and most of all a teacher. That this last is reward enough for
Edwin Patterson I have no doubt.
JOHN W. REED
Professorof Law, University of Michigan
7. See, e.g., the severe and effective criticism of Savigny and the historical school in

§4.31.
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